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Integration v. Regulation? 
Social Regulation in the European Community* 
RENAUD DEROUSSE•• 
A couple of years ago, an influential French newspaper ran a series 
of articles denouncing the 'ultra-liberal' ideology of the 1992 pro-
gramme. The emphasis laid on market integration, it was feared, 
would gradually compel Member States to lower of their regulatory 
protection in a growing number of areas, ranging from consumer 
protection to social policy.l At about the same time, in a much noted 
speech in Bruges, Mrs. Thatcher argued forcefully against some 
over-regulatory tendencies she saw developing in the Community, 
and warned: 
We have not succesfully rolled back the frontiers of the state in Britain only to 
see them re-imposed at a European level, with a European super-state exercising 
a new dominance from Brussels.2 
If anything, the contradiction between these two statements well 
illustrates the point that the interaction between market integration 
and regulation is still largely unclear. 
Divided-power systems such as the European' Community are 
characterized by a complex web of relationships between the compo-
nent units and the center. The analysis of these relationships, and of 
* This paper has been greatly influenced by lengthy discussions with Christian Joerges and Giandomenico Majone, whose contribution is gratefully acknowl-
edged. A first draft was presented at a conference on 'Regulatory Federalism' 
organized in November 1990 by the European University Institute and the 
National Academy for Public Administration (Washington). I am indebted to 
the conference participants for a number of comments and suggestions. 
** European University Institute, Florence. 
2 
See for instance 'Dans lajungle du grand marcM', Le Monde Diplomatique, 
September 1988. Edmond Maire, a former union leader, saw a similar danger 
in the field of social policy. See 'Le social, faille de !'Europe', Le Monde, 
August 23, 1988. 
The Guardian, September 21, 1988. 
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the tensions between uniformity and diversity which tliey generate, is 
one of the principle subjects of modern literature on federalism, 
which lays stress upon the growth of intergovernmental relations 
(Beer, 1974, Elazar, 1984). There is in comparison a relative short-
age of this kind of study as far as the Community is concerned. 
Whereas legal analyses of the Community's institutions and compe-
tences abound, only a few works attempt to analyze in a systematic 
way the dynamics of the relationship between the Community and its 
Member States.3 One probable reason for this gap is that the human 
mind generally finds it easier to comprehend static structures than to 
make sense of moving realities and complex power games. Another 
reason is that this kind of study is by definition interdisciplinary, 
since it entails a combination of law, administrative science and pol-
icy analysis. 
The purpose of this article is to illustrate the potential of this mode 
of analysis by sketching the patterns of relationships that have 
·. emerged in a field which can be defined broadly as social regulation. 
Social regulation is meant here as a set of policies which aim at pre-
serving health, safety at work, the environment, or the interests of 
consumers by correcting collateral effects of economic activities or 
information asymmetries. Social regulation is thus quite distinct 
from traditional social policy, the aims of which are primarily redis-
tributive (Majone and La Spina, 1991, 31). 
This sector has been chosen for a variety of reasons. Social regu-
lation is an area in which government intervention has developed 
considerably in industrialized societies over the last twenty years. 
The phenomenon is even more striking when compared to the gen-
eral crisis of welfare policies. The European Community was not ex-
empt from this general trend. Created as an economic organization, 
it gradually expanded its activities in areas like environmental and 
consumer protection or, more recently, in health policy - a transi-
tion which, as will be shown later, was not devoid of problems. 
Scientific literature reflected this movement with some delay: while 
relations between the Community and its Member States in the 
sphere of economic regulation have been the object ·of some sys-
tematic studies which tried to identify the basic principles underlying 
the 'economic constitution' of the Community, (Constantinesco, 
1977; IEJE, 1970; Mertens de Wilmars, 1988), social regulation as a 
3 The studies published as part of the 'Integration t_hrough ~aw' project_of the 
European University Institute are a notable exception to th1s trend. Seem par-
ticular Rehbinder and Stewart (1985) and Bourgoignie and Trubek (1987) .. 
3 
whole has so far received less attention, even if some of its branches 
have been analysed in detail. 
It is worth stressing at the outset that the ambition of this paper is 
not to present a complete overview of social regulation in the 
European Community (EC), but rather to outline the manner in 
which the division of competences between the Community and its 
Member States affects the way social regulation has developed and is 
carried out in Europe. In doing so, special importance will be at-
tached to consumer and environmental protection policies, which 
have seen considerable change since the creation of the Community. 
The problems can be sub-divided in two general categories. First, 
what is the scope of Community intervention in the field of social 
regulation and how does Membership of the EC affect the Member 
States' capacity to conduct their own regulatory policy? Secondly, 
how are regulatory interventions organized, in particular at 
Community level? Of course the distinction between these two 
themes should not be over-emphasised, for problems of competence 
can have (and indeed have had) a decisive influence on patterns of 
action. However, these two categories provide a good basis for an 
initial exploration of the maze of relationships that exist between the 
Community and its Member States in this area. 
I. The Scope of EC Intervention 
The gradual widening of Community policies to the sector of social 
regulation is a well-known story which need not be repeated here.4 
However, a number of remarks can usefully be made to illustrate the 
specific features of Community intervention in this field. 
For a long time, social regulation was not a primary concern for 
Community institutions. The Community was set up (and is still often 
referred to) as a 'common market'. Quite logically, the emphasis has 
been laid on the removal of obstacles to the free movement of goods, 
capital, persons and services rather than on the control of the side-ef-
fects of economic activity. True, the Community was endowed with 
some competences in the field of workers' health and safety,5 but 
4 For a recent treatment of the question, see for instance Weiler (1991). -
5 Article 118 of the EEC Treaty. 
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policy areas like consumer or environmental protection had not 
gained political prominence at the time the Treaty of Rome was 
drafted. The method of sectorial integration which was chosen thus 
focussed on the economic field, as exemplified by the important 
powers granted to the Community in agricultural and competition 
policies. The generous wording of article 36 of the Treaty of Rome 
clearly suggests large sectors of social regulation were regarded as a 
matter remaining in the hands of the Member States.6 -
Some 35 years later, the picture looks quite different. A mere 
glance at the Community's 'constitution', the EEC Treaty, suffices to 
portray how wide-ranging the evolution has been. Environmental 
policy, consumer protection and health policy have been added to the 
list of Community competences, the first by the Single European 
Act, the other two by the recent Maastricht agreement 
The reasons for this change are manifold. As government inter-
vention in these areas grew, it became apparent that divergence in 
national approaches could create regulatory barriers to trade, no 
matter whether they were inspired by protectionist motives or not. 
This is especially true as regards product norms (Siebert, 1989, 55). 
To take one example, it is unlikely, in the absence of any coordina-
tion, that a given good would meet the standards set by twelve dis-
tinct sets of product safety rules. The Community's response to this 
danger was essentially a judicial one. The broad interpretation given 
by the Court of Justice to Article 30 of the EEC Treaty, which pro-
hibits 'measures having equivalent effect' to quantitative restrictions 
in intra-Community trade, has had a strong impact on the Member 
States room for manoeuvre. In a somewhat sweeping statement, the 
Court ruled that 
all trading rules enacted by the Member States which are capable of hindering, 
actually or potentially, directly or indirectly, intra-Community trade are to be 
considered as measures having an equivalent effect to quantitative resuictions.7 
This amounts to saying that even rules that are not designed to re-
strict cross-border transactions can hamper the free movement of 
goods. As such, they will come under the Court's scrutiny ex Article 
30 (Gormley, 1985). Thus, even in fields which, as we saw remain 
6 Article 36 allows 'prohibitions or resuictions on imports, exports or goods in 
transit justified on grounds of public morality, public policy or public security; 
the protection of health and life of humans, animals or plants; ... or the protec-
tion of indusuial and commercial property', provided these do not constitute 'a 
means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade among the 
Member States.' 
7 In case 8n4, Procureur du Roi v. Dassonville, [1974] ECR 837. 
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primarily in the domestic sphere of competence, the Member States 
must pay regard to the need not to erect legislative barriers to trade. 
As a r~sult, their. regulatory capacity can sometimes be severely 
constramed by thetr Community membership.s 
It has therefore gradually emerged that tensions between market 
integration and regulatory objectives can only be reconciled at 
Community level. Even before the EC was endowed with clear com-
petences in the field of social regulation, Community action devel-
oped in a somewhat interstitial fashion. A strong impetus for the 
broadening of EC powers was given in 1972 at the Paris Summit, 
where the Heads of State and of Government recognized the need for 
a more systematic approach to social regulation. 
One of the main avenues for Community intervention was Article 
100 of the EEC Treaty, which provides for the harmonization of na- :' 
tional provisions that 'directly affect the establishment or the func- · 
tioning of the common market'. Although the exact scope of this 
~rovision and its relationship to other Treaty provisions is the sub-
Ject of legal controversy,9 the requirement of a direct link with the 
common market makes it clear that it could not serve as a basis for 
any activity in the field of social regulation. Likewise, the very con-
cept of 'harmonisation of national provisions' seems to indicate that 
complete uniformity of national legislation was not being sought. 
Re~ort to the 'necessary and proper' clause of the EEC Treaty, 
Article 235, thus proved necessary on a number of occasions,lO 
From the 1970s, EC intervention gradually evolved on this dual 
~asis, at first covering fields where it was clear that national legisla-
tion ~reated obstacles to trade -notably product regulation-, later ex-
pandmg to pave the way towards fully-fledged consumer and envi-
ronmental protection policies. yet, the concept of a: common market 
does not provide any guidelines as to how regulatory policies ought 
to be conducted, or what level of protection ought to be reached: all 
that market integration seems to require is a measure of uniformity. 
The contrasts between diverging regulatory traditions and the lack of 
8 See e.g. case 178/84 (the 'German beer' case}, Commission v. Germany, ECR 
[1987] 1262, and the comments in Sedemund (1988). 
9 It is now generally accepted that it can cover product related requirements as 
well as producer related requirements such as emission standards that impinge 
on competitive conditions (Rehbinder and Stewart, 1985 at 21:26). See also 
Ehlermann (1987) for a post-SEA discussion of the question. 
10 A prima f.acie read!ng of this provision would also suggest that it is not bound-
les~. yet 1ts ext~n~1v~ use fro!D the 1970s seems to defy any attempt at circum-
scnbmg these lumts m a prec1se manner. (Weiler 1991). 
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a consensus on the substantive values to be pursued by Community 
policies clearly hampered their development (Rehbinder and Stewart, 
1985, Joerges, 1991). 
It it is only with the Single European Act that the protection of the 
environment has been given unambiguous recognition in the EEC 
treaty and that its main objectives have been specified.ll At the same 
time, Community intervention in the field of workers' health and 
safety was made easier by a shift to majority voting,12 Even so, the 
wording of the relevant provisions makes it clear that their objective 
: is not to pre-empt Member States' action, which suggests that this 
change was not accepted easily. Article 130R, for instance, specifies 
that 'the Community shall take action relating to the environment to 
the extent to which the objectives [of environment policy] can be at-
tained better at Community level than at the level of the individual 
Member States.' Although the exact status of this provision - mere 
political guideline or enforceable legal restraint - is still debated, its 
restrictive intent is quite clear. Community legislative competence 
appeared to be even weaker with regard to consumer protection, 
which was merely presented as a concern to be taken into account in 
harmonization directives,l3 One had to wait until the Maastricht 
agreement to see the insertion into the Treaty of a comprehensive 
consumer protection policy. 
Turning to practice, one is struck by the fact that, despite such 
institutional restraints, activities in the field of environmental pro-
tection has reached a remarkable intensity even before the adoption 
of the Single Act Even though the reluctance to approve regulatory 
interventions in the field of consumer protection was not overcome 
by the SEA, the Community's free trade objective, forcefully 
restated by the 1992 programme, has led the. Community to engage 
in the creation of comprehensive European regulatory frameworks 
for pharmaceuticals, foodstuffs and technical consumer goods. It 
even increasingly intrudes into areas such as product liability or con-
sumer credit, where what is at stake are essentially the economic in-
terests of consumers. In spite of their ambivalence, one may there-
11 Article 130R. 
12 Article 118A. 
13 Article lOOA (3). True, if it is to be meaningful, this reference suggests that 
some sort of Community action is necessary (Joerges, 1990); yet it seems dif-
ficult to ground in such an elliptic reference the foundation of a proper 
Community competence for the protection of consumers, a competence which 
could go beyond the objective of furthering the harmonization process 
(VerLoren van Thernaat, 1990). 
p 
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fore look at the new Treaty provisions as a legitimization of a prac-
tice that had already largely been accepted. 
It seems difficult to avoid the conclusion that the long term trend 
has been towards an increase in Community competences. Yet, the 
movement is less one-sided than a superficial examination might sug-
gest. Prompted by market integration, Community action in the area 
of social regulation remains largely conditioned by the Community's 
emphasis on the removal of barriers to trade. One could summarize 
the situation by speaking of the 'dual subsidiarity' of social regula-
tion in the structure of the Treaty-ofltoille: subsidiarity with respect 
to the Community's main raison d' etre, namely market integration, 
and subsidiarity with respect to national regulatory policies. For 
those who would regard the above developments as symptomatic of 
lawyers' formalist mode of reasoning, it might be useful to recall 
that in contrast to the power dynamics in 'classical' federal systems, 
Member States retain a crucial role in the Community decision-
making process (Scharpf, 1988). Not only will problems of compe-
tence surface each time a Community measure is deemed to be too 
intrusive by some of them but, equally importantly, patterns of 
Community intervention are likely to bear the mark of these institu-
tional restraints. 
II. Patterns of EC Intervention 
One of the striking features of the American way of approaching 
regulatory issues is a clear reluctance to accept outright federal in-
tervention. Even in fields where legislation might be legitimate, 
Congress has often preferred to rely on a carrot and stick approach 
by setting up large grants-in-aid programmes, which aim at inciting 
states to adopt the standards worked out at the federal level (Stein, 
1985). Likewise, federal intervention has often taken the form of the 
establishment of specialized agencies, to which some rule-making, 
fact-finding and enforcement powers in a specific field were given. 
The functional arguments that have been used to justify the creation 
of such agencies are particularly interesting since they could easily / 
be transposed to the Community. It is often argued, for instance, that 
the delegation of powers to administrative agencies represents a 
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means whereby specific problems might be entrusted to experts who 
possess a deep knowledge of the industry which they regulate, and to 
insulate decisions from the pressures of party politics (Majone, 
1989). 
Yet, turning to the European Community, one fails to discern 
similar developments: harmonisation of national legislation has re-
mained the primary form of action. Moreover, the Community has 
often resorted to what Rehbinder and Stewart have describel as 
command and control regulation, i.e. legislation through which gov-
ernment authorities specify the conduct required of firms and indi-
viduals subject to control (Rehbinder and Stewart, 1985). The EC 
has occasionally provided substantive guidelines for Member States' 
action, by requiring them to collect specific data, or to mutually in-
form each other of decisions adopted in a given field.l4 Yet, it has 
never really departed from its traditional mode of decentralised ad-
ministration. 
Why this difference? In theory, two answers seem possible: either 
the functional needs I alluded to were not felt as strongly in Europe 
as in the United States, or they were addressed with different tech-
niques. The correct answer probably lies in a cocktail of these two 
elements. 
In the first place, it ought to be noted that few alternatives to a 
legislative approach were available at the Community level. The 
Community has limited financial resources, and a large part of them 
are devoted to a voracious agricultural policy, leaving only a limited 
room for manoeuvre in other policies. It seems clear, in any event, 
that the principle of attributed powers makes it impossible for the 
Community to use its spending powers beyond its sphere of legisla-
tive competence (Lenaerts, 1990, 233). As early as 1958, the 
European Court of Justice also indicated that delegation of powers to 
ad hoc bodies not envisaged by the ECSC Treaty were only possible 
subject to strict conditions and that, in any event, the delegation of 
broad discretionary powers was not perrnitted.l5 The difficulties 
which surrounded the creation in 1990 of the European Environment 
14 See for instance the common position adopted in October 1991 by the Council 
of Ministers as regards the proposed directive on general product safety, or di-
rective 83/189 establishing a system of mutual information on technical regula-
tions adopted at nationallevel(OJ L 109/8 of 26 March 1983). 
15 Case 10/56, Meroni, [1957-58] ECR 157. It is generally accepted that although 
this ruling dealt with the fairly detailed provisions of the ECSC treaty, its con-
clusions are mutatis mutandis applicable in the broader context of the EEC 
Treaty (Kapteyn and VerLoren van Themaat, Gormley ed., 1990, 121-122). 
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Agency have confirmed that the US agency model is far from being 
commonly accepted in the Community.l6 
However, to state that the Community's institutional framework 
did not provide the same variety of tools as we find in the United 
States somewhat begs the question: why then, did the framers of the 
Community treaties choose to limit the Community to interventions 
of a legislative type in the field of social regulation? There is no 
clearcut answer ~o such a broad question: the legislative history of 
the EEC Treaty IS not yet open to study, and it is far from certain 
that t?e issue. was addressed at the time the treaty was negotiated. 
Notwtthstandmg, several factors can be identified which might ex-
plain the current situation. 
The. first factor is the limited Community competence in the field -
of soctal regulati~n. As indicated above, the Community was sup-
P?sed to act only 1f, and to the extent that, national regulatory poli-
Cies had an adverse effect on the establishment of a unified market. It 
was therefore proper to limit its intervention to a mere harmoniza-
tion of national provisions, rather than endowing it with more sub-
stantial means of action. The emphasis on the harmonisation of na-
tional provisions can thus be seen as an institutional reflection of the 
peripheral importance of social regulation in the Community con-
text. Ind~ed, C~mmunity lawyers tend to insist that the use by the 
Commumty of Its competences should be such that it will not com-
pletely pre-empt Member States's competence in the area of social 
regulation.l7 Hence, inter alia, a strong insistence the resort to direc-
tives, which need to be transposed by national authorities in their le-
gal order, and thus leave them in theory a certain leeway as to the 
methods by which their objectives are to be achieved.l8 
16 See the Council Regulation on the establishment of the European Environment 
Agency, <?I L 120/1 of 11 May 1990. The Commission has recently advocated 
the estabhshment of an agency to regulate the market of medicinal drugs but 
the powers of the proposed body have been adapted to meet the concern~ ex-
pressed by the Court in the Meroni case. See Future System for the Free 
Movement of Medicinal Products in the European Community, OJ C 310n of 
30 November 91. 
17 See for instance the debate in Fallon and Maniet (1990) regarding product 
safety. 
18 Article 189 of the EEC Treaty. Member States' sensitivity on this issue was 
conf~~ by the adjunction to the Single Act of a declaration inviting the 
Cormmss10n to ~e ~;~se ?f directives in its proposals pursuant to Article lOOA 
whenever harmomzatton mvolves the amendment of legislative provisions in 
one or more Member States. 
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A second factor is the central role of the Member States in the 
Community system. Joseph Weiler has convincingly argued that the 
expansion of Community competences in the. 1970s and the ~ar~y 
1980s can only be understood in the light of this. The Commumty IS 
a far less autonomous body than any federal government. Member 
States still largely control the legislative process; they are responsible 
for the implementation of most Community acts. By virtue. of their 
near total control over the policy··making and implementatiOn pro-
cess, the Community appeared much more as a mere ·additional in-
strument in their hands, rather than as a usurping power. In other 
words, a mutation which in any federal system would have been at 
the expense of the component units was readily accepted by the 
Member States of the Community (Weiler, 1991). 
However, the expansion of Community powers will retain ~is 
neutral character only if Community intrusion into spheres which 
have been traditionally part of the Member States' competence is 
compensated for by the representation of the Member States at all 
stages of the decision-making process. This concern has led to the 
establishment of expert committees, composed of Member States and 
Commission representatives, to assist the Commission ~ its ex~cut~ve 
functions (preparation and implementation of Community legislative 
acts). Although the working of such committees has so far ~e.? the 
object of little systematic attention, it seems that the CommiSSion's 
role in these procedures is primarily one of coordination (Cassese, 
1988). Thus, the functional need for expertise to which I refered 
earlier has been accommodated, but in a manner that clearly reflects 
the specific features of the Community's institution~! setting: In con-
trast, the delegation to an autonomous body of wtde-rangmg law-
making and enforcement powers, similar to those enjoyed by US 
regulatory agencies, is likely to be resented by the Member States as 
more intrusive, since it would alter the delicate balance of power 
which has presided over the growth of Community competences. 
Undoubdtedly, concerns of this kind have played an important part 
in the functions granted to the newly established European 
Environment Agency, which is more concerned with research and 
data collection than with regulation per se. 
Lastly, mention should also be made of elements . of E~ro~ean 
administrative culture which also played a role, albeit an mdtrect 
one, in the developm~nts under review. The creation of specialized 
agencies endowed with extensive powers is far from a traditi?nal 
feature throughout Europe. On the contrary: regulatory functions 
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are often assigned to ministries, or to the cabinet as a whole (Majone, 
1989). Even in the realm of monetary policy, where the need for ex-
pertise is widely accepted, the recent debates over the creation of a 
European system of central banks have clearly shown that most cen-
tral banks do not enjoy the same autonomy as the Deutsche 
Bundesbank. Many of them are still largely dependent on decisions 
made by the Treasury. Governmental supervision and, indirectly, , 
Parliamentary monitoring of administrative action are often re-
garded as necessary in a democratic society. All this makes it rather 
unlikely that national governments will be willing to concede to 
Community bodies powers that they are not always prepared to dele-
gate to domestic bodies. 
As mentioned above, the prototype of Community intervention has 
been to harmonize national laws. As a result, most reviews of 
Community policies are essentially lengthy catalogues of legislative 
provisions. However, a problem-oriented approach reveals a number 
of flaws, the origins of which can be traced to this particular profile 
of Community intervention. 
The difficulties which surround the harmonization process are 
well-known. Decision making is slow and cumbersome because of 
the ever-growing complexity of the subjects covered and of the ne-
cessity of consensus. The adjustment to technical progress is difficult 
(Dashwood, 1983). Moreover, harmonization is made by resorting to 
an instrument - the directive - which has to be transposed by 
Member States in their domestic legal order. This often results in 
huge bottlenecks at the implementation level; it may also explain the 
attention given by Community bodies to formal compliance, namely 
the adoption by national legislatures of the measures prescribed by 
directives, rather than to actual observance of their provisions.l9 
Although the Commission has repeatedly stated its intention to go 
beyond transposition, and to monitor more systematically adminis-
trative application, it is not clear whether it is well equipped to do 
so. Lastly, this two tier legislative process means that the Community 
is deprived of any direct power over firms and other private actors, 
which are the real subjects of social regulation, since it does not have 
the power to attach sanctions to the violation of Community norms 
and to enforce them. 
19 The yearly reports on the implementation of Community law provide a good 
example for the issue in point. See for instance the Eighth Report, COM 
(91)321 fmal, 16 October 1991. 
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All these elements clearly curtail the overall efficiency of 
Community norms. Moreover, as indicated above, the harmonization 
process was primarily dominated by market integration concerns, 
with a corollary emphasis on uniformity. This tendency was further 
aggravated by the fact that the Community, being deprived of an 
administrative body of its own, has often made resort to very de-
tailed directives in order to ensure their uniform application. It is 
not altogether clear that such a process is capable of fully address·ing 
the variety of situations existing within the Community. True, it has 
been demonstrated that, even in its current stage of development, 
Community law possesses a wide range of techniques providing an 
important measure of flexibility (Ehlermann, 1984). Yet, for a va-
riety of reasons, not all difficulties may be anticipated nor accom-
modated in a complex and fairly unflexible legislative phase 
(Scharpf, 1988). Very often, it is only when applying a norm to a 
concrete problem that the various interests involved can be properly 
assessed and balanced. The regulation of pharmaceutical products of-
fers an example of such situation: although national rules pursue 
similar objectives, their application differs widely from country to 
country because of existing divergences between medical and regula-
tory cultures (Kaufer, 1989). 
Naturally, this plea for flexibility should not be seen as invitation 
to grant greater discretionary powers to the Member States, if mar-
ket integration is not to be put at risk. But the issue will have to be 
addressed eventually: otherwise, there is a real risk that Community 
regulation will aggravate an already serious implementation problem 
by being insufficiently sensitive to the variety of situations with 
which national regulators have to deai.20 
Awareness of these problems has clearly grown in Community 
circles over the last few years. Several features of the internal mar-
ket programme were aimed at providing a remedy to the shortcom-
ings of the earlier approach. The emphasis on the mutual recognition 
of national regulations and standards, and the delegation of quasi-
legislative powers to private standardization bodies were conceived 
as alternatives to a cumbersome rule-making process. As a result, the 
White Paper suggested restricting harmonization to the laying down 
of basic health and safety requirements (Commission, 1985, 18). It 
20 In this respect, it is worth noting that the southern Member States of the 
Community, in which there is no strong tradition of regulatory intervention, are 
among those countries which have experienced great difficulties in transposing 
EC directives. 
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was also envisaged that this new approach would increase the range 
of choices available to consumers, thereby creating proper competi-
tion between national rules. The assumption is that this process will 
facilitate technical and regulatory adjustment and eventually lead to 
convergence around one or a few basic models. Thus, ex-ante har-
monisation would be, in part at least, replaced by a market-driven · 
process resulting ultimately in spontaneous adaptation (Prosi, 1990). 
Yet, in spite of its many advantages, mutual recognition cannot be 
seen as a panacea. It is not adapted to all kinds of goods, nor can it 
deal with all regulatory problems (Siebert, 1990, Majone, 1991). In 
fact, rather than as a regulatory technique, mutual recognition can be 
seen as an integration instrument, which creates pressures in favour 
of the removal of trade barriers. Thus, how exactly regulatory in-
terventions should be conducted at Community level largely remains 
an open question. 
HI. The Dynamics of Regulation in the 
European Community 
The above elements may be of use in order to understand some basic 
differences between the dynamics of regulation in the United States 
and the EC. In the American context, the federal government has 
very often played a pioneering role in the field of regulation (Beer, 
1974). In part at least, this was linked to the fact that the states are 
more exposed to pressure from industry, which may easily increase 
the political costs of regulation by threatening to site itself outside 
the state borders. To many interest groups, federal action therefore 
appeared to be the only available way to strengthen government in-
tervention in specific fields: the only alternative to federal action was 
no intervention at all, rather than action at state level (Stenberg, 
1990). The 'New Federalism' policies of the 1970s and the 1980s, 
because of their joint emphasis on de-regulation and swing in favour 
of the states, confirmed a contrario the basic equation between regu-
lation and federal intervention. Federal regulation was also useful 
for industry, as it avoided the risk of inconsistent regulations at state 
level, with consequent market fragmentation. 
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A similar constellation has not yet emerged in the European 
Community. Like their American counterparts, export-oriented in-
dustries clearly have an interest in the removal of legislative barriers 
to trade - hence their strong support for the 1992 programme. In 
contrast, representatives of diffuse interests, like consumer or envi-
ronmental protection organisations, have shown more ambivalent 
feelings towards the Community, in particular in Member States 
where high standards of protection already exist.21 
I Why this has been so can be understood only with reference to the 
structural elements mentioned earlier. The emphasis on free move-
ment in the Treaty of Rome and the generous way in which relevant 
provisions of the Treaty have been read by the European Court of 
Justice have to a large extent limited the Member States' capacity to 
regulate their own economies - not because of a congenital objection 
to any kind of government intervention, but rather because it was 
felt that such intervention should not hamper free movement or dis-
tort competition.22 This appears very clearly in the Court's case-law 
on free movement of goods: in case of conflict, free movement pre-
vails as a rule over regulation. There are of course several important 
exceptions to this rule, some of which are explicitly mentioned in 
Article 36 of the Treaty of Rome. The Court of Justice has also 
admitted that consumer and environmental protection can, in given 
circumstances, justify the maintenance of obstacles to free move-
ment.23 But these are only exceptions, which are· construed nar-
rowly.24 The Court has stressed that Article 36 should in no way be 
seen as reserving given powers to the Member States.25 
At the same time, the Community has been relatively slow to 
establish its own regulatory activities. Not only was its legal title to 
intervene in the field of social regulation rather in a first phase, but 
21 See for instance Bourgoignie (1987, at 121-23 and 215-16) who deplores the 
absence of a strong European consumer movement 
22 A similar reasoning was defended by Pescatore (1979) as regards economic 
regulation. 
23 See cases 120n8, REWE v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung fur Branntwein 
(Cassis de Dijon), [1979] ECR 649 and 302/86, Commission v. Denmark 
[1988] ECR. ' 
24 To assess the admissibility of a national rule that falls under Article 30, the 
Court has resorted to a principle of proportionality: the rule will be regarded as 
compatible with the treaty only if its regulatory objective could not be achieved 
~y ~ther means:.less de~mental to. free movement. Hence, inter alia, a strong 
ms1stence on mfo~attve labelling' (von Heydebrand u.d. Lasa, 1991). 
Moreover, the onus 1s on the Member State concerned to demonstrate that its 
regulation was necessary. 
25 Case 5n7, Simmenthal, ECR [1977] 1555, at 1557. 
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the nature of Community decision-making processes is such that 
Community regulatory intervention is often difficult to achieve, 
since the Community is far less immune from Member States' influ-
ence than the US Federal Government. In such a context, a political 
consensus on the necessity of acting at the European level will be a 
pre-requisite to any kind of Community intervention. This tends to 
give a bargaining advantage to Member States which oppose high 
levels of protection, who can trade their acceptance of Community 
intervention against a number of substantive concessions. The prob-
lem was further complicated by the fact that some countries in which 
a regulatory tradition existed, such as Denmark or the United 
Kingdom, did not favour large transfers of power to the 
Community. 
Adopting a comprehensive view of social regulation, encompass-
ing both the national and the EC level, some have argued that the 
division of competences between the EC and its Member States cre-
ated a true 'regulatory gap': whereas in theory Community compe-
tences remained limited and difficult to use, Member States' Treaty 
obligations made it more difficult for them to exercise fully the 
regulatory competences they still retain (Bourgoignie and Trubek, 
1987). This de-regulatory bias was implicitly acknowledged by 
Member States representatives at the time of drafting the Single Act: 
in direct contradiction to the case-law of the European Court of 
Justice,26 it was felt necessary to provide for escape clauses enabling 
Member States which enjoyed high levels of protection to retain their 
national rules even in the presence of harmonisation measures.27 
Interestingly, no corresponding mechanism was provided for those 
Member States which favour a lower level of protection, which may 
be seen as a confirmation that the system as it stood was not seen to 
involve real dangers for them.28 
The 1992 programme has given rise to increased fears of de-regu-
latory pressures. As is known, this programme essentially aims at a 
complete elimination of non-tariff barriers to trade in the EC, many 
of which arise because of differences between the regulatory policies 
of the Member States. Thus, the thrust of the programme consists of 
increased emphasis on what is often defined as negative integration, 
26 Case 25In8, Denkavit, [1979) ECR 3369. 
27 f>rticles 1.00 J>;.. ~ara. 4, and 130 R, para. Safeguard clauses inspired by the 
Model Drrecttve of 4 may 1985 (OJ C136, 4 June 1985) have been inserted in 
many consumer protection directives (Joerges and Miclclitz, 1991). 
28 Howeyer, th~s prov~ to~ a short-sighted view, as the shift to majority voting 
made It poss1ble to 1gnore Isolated opposition to regulation (Weiler, 1991). 
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rather than on a complete take-over of given policy areas by the 
Conun1Jlli!Y: .... 'I'be central technique proposed by the Commission's 
White Papedo' achieve this objective was mutual recognition be-
tween national norms - a concept stemming from the idea that the 
main regulatory policies pursued by the Member States attempt, as a 
rule, to achieve similar objectives. 
Many expected this emphasis on negative integration to fur$er 
reinforce de-regulatory pressures. Not only would Member States' 
regulatory activities be exposed to increased competition from other 
States' rules but, in addition, they would be more closely monitored 
than in the past. In theory, in a system of complete mobility for all 
factors of production, firms could even decide how to best allocate 
their resources in order to avoid being exposed to heavy regulatory 
burdens. This might in tum trigger the 'race to the bottom' de-
nounced by some American specialists: in order to avoid losing their 
competitive position in the Community markets, national govern-
ments might would be tempted to lower their regulatory require-
ments. The competition between rules that mutual recognition entails 
would thus lead to .a retreat of government in a number of areas 
(McGee and Weatherhi~. 1990f) 
iiis faido say that neither of these two trends has yet materialized 
to any substantial degree. In spite of the indisputable success of the 
1992 programme, there is no evidence that it has generated any sig-
: nificant reallocation of resources on the part of industry. Neither has 
a real race to the bottom in terms of regulatory protection been 
noted. True, a measure of government retreat has been noticeable in 
some countries, but this evolution was linked to a general re-discov-
ery of the virtues of the market economy, rather than being a mere 
by-product of the integration process.29 
Certainly, the situation was perhaps less one-sided than a glance at 
institutional structures might suggest, be it only because the situation 
was not uniform throughout the Community. Most southern Member 
States, for example, lacked adequate frameworks for environmental 
and consumer protection. Community policies have been important 
for these countries, both as a source of national legislation and as a 
means of strengthening the position of environmental ministries and 
29 If anything, the opposite was true: adoption of the internal market programme 
and its institutional corollary, the Single European Act, was greatly facilitated 
by the fact that they were in syntony with this evolution (Dehousse, 1989, 
Pelkrnans, 1990). 
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public interest groups with respect to the agricultural and industrial 
lobbies, and their political representatives. 
The advocates of the 'race to the bottom' theory also appear to 
have over-estimated the risks inherent in the mutual recognition 
strategy. What they failed to understand is that mutual recognition 
cannot operate in a vacuum: for the system to be operational, its ba-
sic premise (the equivalence of national provisions) must reflect re-
ality. Where the objectives pursued by the Member States or their 
methods diverge, mutual recognition is of no help.JO Thus, as antici-
pated in the Commission's White Paper on the completion of the in-
ternal market, mutual recognition is a viable avenue, only if accom-
panied by a harmonization of basic requirements contained in na-
tional provisions. In this sense, harmonization and mutual recogni-
tion are not mutually exclusive, but rather complementary ap-
proaches. Basic regulations and standards, if adopted throughout the 
Community, should both prevent an unlimited 'race to the bottom' 
and provide a target for regulatory convergence. Moreover, a num-
ber of elements will act as a brake on the downwards spiral: a coun-
try lowering its level of protection, for instance, would put at risk 
the health of its own citizens, which might have some incidence on 
their electoral choices (Siebert, 1990). 
Another element which was ill-perceived was the impact of the 
institutional reforms contained in the Single European Act. The 
Community's competence to intervene in the field of social regula-
tion was strengthened, even though somewhat ambiguously. A ma-
jority vote was made possible in a number of areas, in particular for 
the adoption of product legislation, which occupies a central place in 
Community activities. This change proved to be more. important than 
many initially expected (Dehousse, 1989). Even if majority voting in 
the Council of Ministers remains to a large extent an exception, the 
possibility that a vote will be taken has had a decisive impact on de-
cision-making. Instead of negotiating in the shadow of a veto, 
Member States very often have to negotiate while keeping in mind 
the possibility of being outvoted, should a vote be taken. In many 
fields where for many years no decision had been possible, com-
promise has now been reached within months (Ehlermann, 1990). In 
other words, the most radical critique of the White Paper strategy 
proved to be excessive at both levels: regulatory competition among 
30 This ~ppeared clearly in case 188/84, Commission v. France (woodworking 
machines), [1986] ECR 419. Another example is offered by the situation in the 
sector of pharmaceutical products (Kaufer, 1989). 
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Member States has not dramatically increased, and the possibility of 
an intervention at the EC level has proved more concrete than it was 
initially thought. 
This notwithstanding, a number of bottlenecks remain. By and 
large, social regulation is still largely regarded as a secondary tkld 
~~ctivity ~in' - a field in which the EC should in 
tl!eoryJ!lt~rvene_only_ to prevent nat10iiaCregulatory-pofiCiestiOiil 
~!~~~~~~-!~~~J!l~~~l1l~"~!:_~~ the fact that-unanimity is -stiiire----
qmred m certam sectors, even after Maastricht,3l slows down deci-
sion-making, sometimes to a considerable extent. It also reinforces 
the part played by jurisdictional concerns in any decision as to the 
necessity for Community action in a given field. 
. Yet, the de-regulatory pressures linked to the Community empha-
SIS on free movement seem now to be more clearly perceived than 
they were some years ago. The dynamics familiar to the observers of 
the US scene, where advocates of high protection levels generally 
favour federal intervention, is gradually emerging. 
Such a change may be prompted by a variety of reasons. 
Community environmental policy relies increasingly on the active 
involvement of environmental groups (Sands, 1990), which may 
have generated new expectations. As indicated above, even national 
?ove~ents appear to be more clearly aware of the de-regulatory 
Impact mherent in the current division of labour between the 
Community and its Member States. Ten years ago, it could be 
asserted that in a field such as consumer protection, 'there is no sit-
uation wherein the national policy option is not a ... viable alternative 
in the absence of agreement at the Community level' (Weiler, 1982, 
/
49). This no longer seems to be the case: the increasing reach of 
Community law makes it ever more difficult for Member States to 
I separately conduct their own regulatory policies. Those Member States that favour high protection levels increasingly prefer to press 1 for a decision at Community level, rather than seeking an escape 
I clause which might harm the interests of their own producers.32 
31 This i~ the case for ~ertain measures adopted in the framework of environmen-
tal pohcy ~ew ~cle 130 S). However, unanimity is not required for internal 
market. l~g1slauon adopted on the basis of Article 100 A. Case 300/89, 
CommiSSion v. Council of 11 June 1991 (Titanium dioxide, not yet reported) 
has opened the door to a more systematic use of this provision in the field of 
environmental policy. 
32 It ~s w~rth noting in this respect that the much criticized derogation clause con-
tamed mart. 100 A (4) has so far never been used. This, however does not 
amount to saying that it is meaningless: the mere fact that one Me~ber State 
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Significantly, a country like Denmark, which has always shown great 
reluctance to delegate new powers to the Community, has been 
pressing for a generalization of majority voting in the areas of social 
and environmental protection. Thus, even for national governments, 
jurisdictional concerns can give way to regulatory concerns. 
Assuredly, this shift has played an important part in the further ex-
tension of Community competences enacted by the Maastricht 
agreements. 
IV. Conclusion: Regulatory Gaps Revisited 
In divided power systems, regulation is the result of conflicting pres-
sures, for the traditional questions - ~~~t to regulate and..how - are 
complicated by a further problem: at wr ich lev_e_l should regulatory 
activities be pursued? These issues cannot be debated separately. On 
the American scene, for instance, the advocates of high standards of 
protection tend to favour federal intervention because it is more ef-
fective; conversely the States' Rights issue is often used as a fig leaf 
by those who oppose regulatory interventions. 
I have argued that regulatory and institutional issues are also 
closely intertwined in the European Community. The emphasis on 
market integration in the EEC Treaty, with the uniformity pressure 
it generates, and the difficulties linked to decision-making by consen-
sus, have affected both the scope and the form of Community regula-
tory intervention. The focus on product regulation arid the emphasis 
on a purely economic objective, the removal of trade barriers, can 
be related to these structural elements. Clearly, regulation in the 
'American way' is not a viable option in the today's Community. 
The 'classical' regulatory gap theory argues that the overall effect 
of Community intervention has been de-regulatory. Whereas 
Member States have seen their regulatory capacity constrained by 
their EC membership, the Community has not clearly emerged as a 
dominant regulator like the US Federal Government. As a result, 
Member States with high levels of protection, often unable to secure 
might have sought a derogation on this basis, and thus isolate its own market, 
may have played a role in some negotiations. 
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the development of far-reaching policies at Community level, have 
traditionally insisted on retaining a margin of discretion. 
To some extent at least, this kind of de-regulatory bias was fore-
seeable. All divided power systems, precisely because they fragment 
power, tend to make government intervention more difficult - what-
ever its level or its form. This is why the champions of government 
intervention have never been fond of federal systems. The fierce 
critique of federalism put forward by Harold Laski in the 1930s 
finds an echo in many of the criticisms addressed today to the 
Community: 
Federalism ... is unsufficiently positive in character; it does not provide for suf-
ficient rapidity of action; it inhibits the emergence of necessary standards of uni-
formity; it relies upon compacts and compromises which take insufficient ac-
count of the urgent category of time; ... its psychological results, especially in an 
age of crisis, are depressing to a democracy that needs the drama of positive 
achievement to retain its faith. (Laski, 1939) 
Of course Laski was writing on the forces that hindered the emer-
gence of a welfare state, which he supported, while we are now ad-
dressing the development of some sort of regulatory state. Yet his 
analysis of the logic inherent in any divided power system remains 
largely correct. 
It has been suggested that the EEC Treaty may be regard!!d as 
economically ambivalent, in that many provisions are broad enough 
to allow the development of economic policies that range from neo-
liberalism to Soziale-Marktwirtschaft (Mertens de Wilmars, 1988, 
26). Yet it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the combined ef-
fect of market integration and power fragmentation is to make gov-
ernment intervention more difficult. 
The point seems worth making, as a contribution to the developing 
. ideological debate on the integration process (Snyder, 1990). But it is 
i not decisive, for policies are more than the mechanical product of an I institutional machinery. Ide~ogies, interests, or the st~egies of de-l cision-makers all play an equally important part in the fmal decision. 
In this respect, we may have reached a turning point in the wake 
of the internal market programme. The constraints that impinge on 
national regulatory policies have accrued but, in contrast, decision-
making has become easier at the Community level. As the 
Community is by no means immune from pressures for a more ac-
tive intervention in fields like environment or consumer protection 
which have been gaining strength throughout the industrialized 
world over the past decades, there are reasons to believe that in fu-
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ture years regulatory policies will further develop at Community 
level (Majone, 1989). Issues of risk control are likely to become 
central once a single market will be achieved, and a large number of 
Member States seem to accept that tensions between market integra-
tion and regulation can only be resolved at Community level. 
This notwithstanding, it is important to understand that, short of a 
major change, these pressures will have to be processed by the insti-
tutional system of the Community. Whatever reforms they lead to. 
the concerns - substantive, of course, but also institutional - of the 
Member States, will have to be met, as they remain the primary ac-
tors in the Community politico-legal system. We might therefore be 
faced in the near future with a new type of regulatory gap, with a 
Community that would be present in an increasing number of areas, 
but forced by institutional considerations to stick to a sub-optimal 
mode of intervention - the harmonization of laws. If this were the 
. case, the contradiction between the two statements referred to in the 
introduction to this paper might prove more apparent than real. 
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